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iana, recently effected, has superseded the functions of Judge
PEABODY, by the terms of his commission, and he descends from
the bench to take the place of United States District Attorney.
We shall look with interest to see whether the equity of the
judgments of the Provisional Court and their apparent necessity
will induce his successors to respect and uphold them, or whether

the rule will be followed, which is indicated in Jecker vs. fontgomery, and the gates of litigation thrown open anew.

B.

New Haven, Conn., February, 1865.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
TOWN OF NEW MARKET VS. ROBERT SMART.
In a grant "to the inhabitants of a town, to be held by them as a body politic
and corporate, and to their successors for ever," the title vests in the town as a
corporation.
In the case of such grant made in 1803, to the use of the minister then settled
in the town of New Market, as long as he should be the settled Congregational
minister there; and then to be and remain for the use of the minister of that
persuasion that shall be settled in that town, the title rests in the town in its
parochial, and not in its municipal character.
Where the voluntary religious society which existed at the time of this grant,
and over which the minister referred to was settled, was afterwards under the
statute of July 3, 1827, organized and became a body corporate and politic,
capable of taking and holding real and personal estate for the use of the society;
and the town was no longer charged with any parochial duties in relation to
such society; held, that the legal, as well as beneficial, estate in the lands so
granted, passed to, and were vested in, that society, as the successor to the parochial rights and duties formerly belonging to the town.
Where the cestui que trust in possession disavows the trust, and claims to hold
the land by a title hostile to that of the trustee; and this, by some clear and
unequivocal act, is distinctly brought to the knowledge of the trustee ; the possession will from that time be deemed to be adverse.
In such a case it is not essential that the cestui que trust should claim an absolute fee simple or freehold in himself, but it is sufficient if the title claimed be in
trust for the use of the ministry in a certain religious society for ever.

This is an action of trespass quare clausum fregit. The locus
in quo is in South New Market, and is known as the Parsonage.

The plaintiff claims under one Pike and others, who being seised
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in 1803, conveyed the land to the inhabitants of New Market,
"to have and to hold the same as a body politic and corporate,
and to their successors for ever, to and for the use of the minister
now settled in said town, for and during the term of his ministry
in said town, or as long as he shall continue to be the settled
Congregational minister of said town, and there to be and remain
as a parsonage for the use of the minister of the Congregational persuasion that shall be settled there."
It appeared in evidence, that the price paid for this property
was $900, and that this sum was raised at a meeting called by
the selectmen of New Market in February, 1803, by a warrant
addressed to the legal voters of New Market qualified to vote in
ministerial affairs, and that the tax was assessed upon one hundred and fifty-eight persons only, when the whole number of taxpayers in the town was two hundred and seventy-seven, and that
the meetings in relation to preaching, the care of the parsonage,
and other ministerial affairs, were usually called in the manner
above described.. It appeared also, that the minister who was
there settled at the time of this grant, the Rev. Mr. Thurston,
remained until 1808, and occupied the parsonage, and after him
several other ministers preached in the same house and occupied
the parsonage, down to 1829, but none of them were settled
there; that in 1829, certain individuals, a majority of whom were
proved to have attended some of the meetings of those qualified to
vote in ministerial affairs, between 1803 and 1829, formed themselves into a religious society, under the statute of July 3d 1827,
by the name of the South Congregational Society of INew Market,
adopted a constitution, and made a record of their proceedings ;
and that this society assumed the management, and had the use
and income of the parsonage from 1829 to 1853, when, under a
vote of the s6ciety, it was leased to the defendant for ninety-nine
years, for the sum of $800. That this society had preaching of
the Congregational order at this meeting-house a portion of the
time every year until 1840, when they procured a new meetinghouse, settled a minister of the same order, and have had preaching there ever since, until the spring of 1862, when their minister died.
It appeared that the sum received for the lease of the parsonage was expended by the society in the purchase of a lot of land
for another parsonage near the new meeting-house, which was
about two miles from the old one; and the evidence tended to
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show that from 1829 to 1858, the society managed ana had the
income of the old parsonage, without interruption from the town;
and that since said lease the defendant also occupied it without
interruption until 1861. In 1849, the town of New Market was
divided, and the South Congregational Society, with their meetinghouse and the parsonage in question, fell within the new town
called South New Market, and it appeared that in the part which
retained the original name of New Market, there was another
Congregational Church and Society, which commenced about
1829, and much of the time have had a settled minister and
preaching of that persuasion, at their meeting-house, which is in
what is now New Market.
The other facts and evidence bearing upon the questions raised
sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.
Upon the evidence adduced, 'the court directed a verdict for
the plaintiff, and the defendant excepted, and the questions were
reserved for the whole court.
Small, for the plaintiff.
Christie J-Stickney, for defendant.
BELLOWS, J.-It is objected that this is a conveyance to the

inhabitants of New Market, and not to the town as a corporation ; and, therefore, that the action must fail for want of title.
But we think the objection is not well founded, as the grant was
to the inhabitants in their collective capacity as a permanent body,
and having successors, and with the power to hold the land for
ever; and this is not an unusual way of describing a municipal
corporation. The case of Chapin and Wife vs. School -District,
35 N. H. Rep. 450,. is directly in point. See also Poster vs.
Lane et al., 30 N. H. Rep. 305 ; Mayor et al. of Sussex and
Sidney College vs. -Davenport,1 Wils. 184; Angell & Ames on
Corp. 206, and cases cited; 4 Greenl. Cruise's Dig. 264.
The question then arises, whether the title acquired by this
grant vested in the town in its municipal, or in its parochial character; and, if in the latter, whether the town still retained such
title after the incorporation of a parish, and after the town had
ceased to have parochial rights and duties.
It is quite clear that sucli rights and duties belonged to towns
before the law of 1819, known as the Toleration Act, and continued after that Act in respect to contracts then existing with
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settled ministers ; and that in the discharge of those duties the
action was in the name of the towns, and through the instrumentality of town-meetings, although members of dissenting religious
sects neither acted in such meetings, nor were subject to be taxed
for such purposes, as appears to have been the fact in the case
before us. Such also was the fact in Massachusetts: -Dillingham
vs. Snow et al., 3 Mass. 282; Same vs. Same, 5 Id. 547 ; Jewett
vs. Burroughs, 10 Id. 464; Milford vs. Godfrey, I Pick. 91.
And it is equally clear that these parochial rights and duties were
largely exercised by parishes distinct from municipal organizations; and for that purpose towns were often divided into two
parishes, to which by law were committed these parochial duties.
In other instances, such parishes were composed of parts of two
or more towns.
If no other provision for the performance of such parochial
duties was made, it was by a general law imposed upon the towns.
In Massachusetts every town is considered to be a parish until
a separate parish be formed within it: First .Parishin Brunswick vs. Dunning et al., 7 Mass. 447; Ludlow vs. Sikces, 19
Pick. 323.
The grant then being for the use of the Congregational minister,
then settled in town during his ministry, and then to be and
remain for the use of his successors in that office, the title must
be regarded as vested in the town in its parochial, and not in its
municipal character.
In Massachusetts this distinction is fully recognised in numerous judicial decisions growing out of the grants in the original
charters of towns, of a share or right of land for the first settled
minister, and another for the use of the ministry ; it being held
there, that these lands were granted for pious uses, to be held in
trust as a permanent fund for the support of religious worship;
and, accordingly, by an early provincial statute, re-enacted under
their state constitution, ministers of Protestant churches were
made sole corporations, capable of taking in succession any parsonage lands granted to the minister and his successor; or granted
to the use of the ministry.
This idea was evidently borrowed from the common law, by
which the parson of a church, as a sole corporation, was deemed
to be seised in right of the church, jure ecelesike, of all the church
lands.
Hence in Massachusetts, in most if not all the towns, lands
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were set apart for the minister, or the ministry; numerous questions arose as to the application of the funds accruing from such
lands, and the state of the titles, which were settled by .their
courts.
In New Hampshire, on the contrary, the courts have decided,
in accordance with long usage, that the lands or shares, so set
apart for the first settled minister, and for the use of the ministry, vested absolutely, in the one case in the first settled minister,
and in the other in the town, and were not held in trust for pious
uses: Baptist Society in tilton vs. Town of Wilton, 2 N. H.
Rep. 508; (andia vs. French, 8 Id. 133; consequently questions
of this sort have rarely been the -subject of judicial investigation.
But still, wherever there are grants to pious uses, as in this
case, they are to be interpreted by the principles of the common
law, as modified by statutes or usage.
By the common law, as the church was not a body corporate
capable of holding an estate in lands, the rector was deemed to
represent it; to take upon himself the person of the church, personam gert, and as such, when inducted into office, became seised
of the church property, including the glebe, the church edifice,
tithes, and oblations ; but he was seised only in right of the
church, and had no power of alienation beyond the time of his
ministry, and, therefore, on his resignation, death, or deprivation,
the freehold was said to be in abeyance, until his successor was
inducted into office: Com. Dig. tit. Ecclesiastical Persons, C. 9;
and also tit. Abeyance, A. 1-3; Co. Litt. 341 a; Co. Litt. 300 a;
Com. Dig. .Esglise, G. 1 ; Town of Pawlet vs. Clark, 9 Cranch
292, where is a learned opinion of SToRY, J.
It is obvious that the estate of the parson is peculiar. It is
not a fee simple, for he cannot lease the land beyond the term
of his office, nor is it strictly an absolute estate for life, because
it terminates by his resignation or deprivation ; but the freehold
is so far in him, that he may maintain a real action to recover it.
The fee simple, however, is held by the early authorities to be in
abeyance, even although there be a parson in office-the church
having no capacity to take it: Co. Litt. 341 a; Com. Dig.
Abeyance, A. 1-3.
But however this may be, and whether the fee simple may-be
regarded as in abeyance during the life of the parson or not, the
glebe is the dowry of the church, and in its right is it held by
the parson: Pawlet vs. Clark, 9 Cranch 329, and cases cited.
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In Massachusetts, where the minister is by statute made a sole
corporation, capable of taking in succession the parsonage lands,
-it is held that his rights are clearly defined at common law ; that
he holds the lands in right of the parish or church ; that on his
resignation, deprivation, or death, the fee is- in abeyance until
there be a successor; and, that during the vacancy, the parish
or church have the custody, and are entitled to the profits of the
parsonage: Weston vs. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500; First Parish of

Brunswick vs. Dunning et al., 7 Id. 445.
So it is held in Massachusetts, that lands granted to a town
for the use of the ministry vest in the town in its parochial
capacity; and that upon the erection or incorporation of the first
parish in such town, the lands vest in the parish, which succeeds
to the parochial rights and duties before belonging to the town:
Milton vs. The FirstParishin Milton, 10 Pick. 447.
Ordinarily, upon the creation of a parish composed of a part
of a town divided geographically, or consisting of such inhabit-

ants as are attached to a particular religious sect, which is termed
a poll-parish, what is left is by statute in Massachusetts deemed to
be the first parish ; and the minister df that parish holds all the
lands to him and his successor, which he held as minister of the
town before the separation: .First Parish of Brunswick vs.
-Dunninget al., 7 Mass. 445, decided in 1811.
In this case, which was trespass for breaking and entering
the plaintiff's close, being a lot of land laid out by the
Pejepscut proprietors for the use of the ministry, it appeared
that the last settled minister was dismissed in the year 1800, and
it was decided that the parish was entitled to the rents and profits
of the land, and to the custody of the same during the vacancy
in the pastoral office, and was, therefore, entitled to recover.
See also Minot vs. Curtis et al., 7 Mass. 441, which is the case
of a poll-parish: Sutton vs. Cole, 8 Mass. 96; First Parish in
Medford vs. Medford, 21. Pick. 199. So is Ludlow vs. Sikes,
19 Pick. 317, where the town sold the land granted for the use
of the ministry, and applied the income derived from the price to
that use: held, that the town took the property in its parochial
capacity, and that upon the separate organization of the first
parish, the fund became the property of that parish; and also
held, that whether the town act in its parochial capacity or otherwise, is often determined merely by the nature of the act done.
See also Shrewsbury vs. Smith, 14 Pick. 297.
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The case of grants and dedications to public and religious uses
form an exception to the general rule applicable to private grants,
which require a grantee capable of taking the estate; whereas in
the former, the grant may take effect although there be no
grantee in esse.
Upon this ground it was decided in Pawlet vs. Clark, 9 Cranch
292, before cited, that a grant by the Crown of a township in
sixty-eight shares, one of which was appropriated -for a glebe
for the Church of England, as by law established," would take
effect as a grant of that share to the parson of the Church of
England in that town, whenever such church was there established,
and a parson inducted into office; although at the time of the
grant no such church existed, nor any grantee capable of taking
the fee. That the parson when so inducted would take the land
as an endowment, to be held in right of the church, jure ecelesice,
and that in the mean time the fee would be in abeyance without
any power in the Crown to resume or recall the grant.
Upon a similar principle is the case of Beattey vs. Kurtz, 2
Pet. 566, where a lot of land was marked off "' for the Lutheran
Church," upon a recorded plan and survey for a burying-ground;
but no grant was made, nor was such an incorporated society in
existence-but the land was used for interments for many years.
The court consider the dedication of property to public or religious uses as an exception to the general rule requiring a particular grantee, and like the dedication of a highway to the public.
So in Cincinnati vs. White's Lessees, 6 Peters's U. S. Rep.
431, it was held that an owner may dedicate land to the use of
the public as an open square, without the legal title passing from
him ; and yet the public acquire a vested interest in it, so that
the owner cannot maintain ejectment to recover possession of it ;
and the court put it upon the same ground as dedications for
charitable and religious purposes, and for public highways, where
there is no grantee in esse to take the fee; and it is said that
these cases are exceptions to the rule applicable to private grants,
and from necessity. See also Second Cong. Soc. in Hopkinton vs.
First Cong. Soc. in Ropkinton et al., 14 N. H. 314.
Upon similar views has been the legislation in New Hampshire,
by which religious societies, though unincorporated, are empowered to take grants of lands and other donations, and to sue and
be sued in respect to them ; and also providing that the minister
of any denomination shall be capable of taking in succession any

NEW MARKET vs. SMART.

parsonage lands granted to the minister and his successors, or to
the use of the ministry, or granted by any words of like import:
Rev. Statutes cb. 144, § 7, 8, 10, and 12.
It is obvious that these provisions in respect to the granting,
holding, and disposition of lands designed for the use of the
ministry, are in substantial accordance with the common law, and
with the course of the courts in Massachusetts, under the provisions of their statutes : and although they were enacted some
years after the formation of the South Congregational Society in
New Iarket as. an incorporated body, they afford a strong argument in favor of adopting the provisions of the common law, and
the decisions in Massachusetts and elsewhere under it, and give
to those decisions a weight which they might not otherwise be
entitled to.
Indeed the proVision in section 10, before cited, empowering
ministers to take in succession lands granted to them, or to the
use of the ministry, or granted by any words of like import,
looks much like placing ministerial lands in New Hampshire upon
the same footing as in Massachusetts.
A similar principle seems to have been applied to the tran8fer
of the rights acquired under such grants, as well as to the grants
themselves, by the courts; by which, in the case of land granted
for the use of the-ministry, the freehold has been deemed to be
in the town or parish, according as the parochial rights and duties
were found to be in the one or the other, and shifting as those
rights and duties by law pass from the one to the other.
Indeed, considering the nature of such grants, and that no
grantee in esse capable of taking the fee -is necessary, there.can
be no objection, as we can see, to holding that the person or corporate body having the duty of making application of the fund to
its legitimate uses, is so far seised of the property as to be able to
hold it against the original grantor, and also to maintain a suit
'to recover possession of it.
In The Dublin Case, 88 N. H. 485, a bequest was made to a
town in trust for the support of the Christian religion in a religious society in that town, the interest to be paid to its minister.
This was then a voluntary society, but after the testator's death
it became a corporation under the statute; and it was held that
the beneficial interest in 'this fund vested in the corporation,
although formally not the same body as the other.
In New Hampshire the minister was not, until the revised
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statutes, understood to be a sole corporation capable of holding
ministerial lands in succession; but the same object was often
sought to be accomplished by a conveyance to the town to hold
in trust for the use of the ministry, especially when no incorporated religious society capable of taking the title existed.
But upon the incorporation of the parish entitled to the use of
the property, so as to render it capable of taking the title, and
in fact making it the successor of the town in respect to its parochial rights and duties, such title, though but the legal estate,
would upon the principles adverted to become vested at once in
the parish ; and to this we can see no objection.
It is true the grant may be in such terms as to show an intent
to make the town a perpetual trustee, and in such case the law
would carry it into effect; but where the grant is to the town for
the use of the ministry, or the settled minister, as in this case, it
may well be regarded, as in Massachusetts, as set apart for the
support of public worship, and as vesting the title in the town in
its parochial character, and in such legal body as may afterwards
succeed to such parochial rights and duties.
To hold that the property in this case vested in the town in
its municipal character, would be manifestly unjust and contrary
to the plain purpose of the grant, which was to aid in the support
of a minister in that place, of the Congregational persuasion ;
and especially as the taxes from which the price was paid was
assessed, not upon the inhabitants of the town generally, but, as
the jury might have found, upon that portion only who belonged
to the Congregational Society, or, at least, who did not belong to
any other religious sect, as such only under our Bill of Rights
could have been lawfully taxed. Besides, the money was actually raised at a meeting called, not of the inhabitants generally,
but only of those qualified to vote in Congregational ministerial
affairs, although acting in the name of the town-thus furnishing
an example of the distinction alluded to between the parochial
and municipal character, with which the towns were invested.
At the time of this grant there appears to have been a Congregational society in the town with a settled minister, and there
is evidence from which a jury might have found, that in 1829 the
individuals composing it were organized under the Statute of July
1827, and became a body corporate and politic, capable of taking
and holding real and personal estate for the use of the society;
that from this time this society managed the parsonage without
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interruption from the town until December 1861, occupying or
leasing it, and receiving the income during all that period, and
maintaining every year religious worship of the Congregational
order at the old house until 1840, when they procured a new one
which they have ever since occupied.
Under these circumstances, and with the other evidence ad-

duced, the jury might have found that the society thus organized
as a body corporate, was substantially the same as the voluntary
religious society in existence at the time of the grant in question,
and for the use of whose settled minister the grant was made.
See The -Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 513.
Upon such a finding, the society having all the powers of the
body politic, known as a parish, and having thus succeeded to the
parochial rights and duties, which in respect to religious worship
of the Congregational order at this place, had before belonged to
the town, and the town being entirely divested of such rights and
duties by the law of 1819, there being then no settled minister in
that town, there could, as we conceive, be no objection to holding
that the title to this land became vested in the society.
In respect to parishes in Massachusetts, it is, as we have seen,
well settled, that such is the law, and no difference is perceived
between those parishes and such incorporated religious society.
Indeed, it is expressly decided in First Parihof Sutton vs.
Cole et al., 8 Mass. 96, that such incorporated society is to every
intent a parish, and that in their bill of rights, and in their laws,
the terms parish and religious society have the same meaning and
effect.
By our laws of 1819 and 1827, religious societies formed under
them were declared to be bodies corporate and politic with perpetual succession, and with all the powers, privileges, and immunities, and subject to all liabilities incident to corporations of a
similar nature; and with power to purchase and hold land for a.
place of public worship, and for a parsonage-house, and other
buildings connected therewith; and for supporting the ministry
in said society; and to improve, sell, convey, and dispose of the
same for the sole use of the society-giving such societies powers
to choose the necessary officers, make by-laws, and to raise and
assess taxes upon the polls and estates of its members; and giving
to the assessors and collectors of such societies the same powers
in assessing and collecting taxes, and subjecting them to the same
penalties as similar town officers are liable to.
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The powers thus conferred upon these societies are ample, so far
as parochial affairs are concerned, and as much so, for aught we
can see, as those conferred upon parishes; and we can perceive no
objection to holding that, where such society is the successor of
the town in respect to its parochial duties, it also succeeds to its
corresponding parochial rights. In both respects the society is the
legitimate successor of the town, which, although it may continue
to exist in its municipal capacity, has no longer its parochial
functions, they being transferred to the parish which succeeds it,
by operation of law.
The objections in the way of taking this view are more formal
than real, arising mainly from these separate municipal and parochial functions being exercised under the same corporate name;
but bearing in mind that there were substantially two different
corporations, and that the new parish has succeeded to the rights
and duties of one, the propriety of holding that it takes the lands
held by it for parochial use, becomes apparent, especially when
as to such public rights and interest no embarrassment arises
from the want of a deed of conveyance.
. If then the religious society in New Market, so incorporated in
1829, is found to be the successor to the voluntary society existing at the time of this grant, and thus has succeeded to the parochial rights and duties in respect to that parish, which before
belonged to the town, we think the society has such an interest in
this parsonage, that it cannot be deprived of its possession by
the town.
As the verdict is to be set aside, it is unnecessary to examine
the question of adverse occupation, as raised on the evidence
reported.
It is however unquestionably true, as a general proposition,
that the possession of the cestui que trust will not be deemed to be
adverse, so long as it conforms to, or is consistent with the terms
of the trust-deed-or, in other words, so long as the trust is a
continuing and subsisting one, and acknowledged and acted upon
by the parties; but when it is disavowed by the party in possession, whether it be the trustee or cestui que trust, and he distinctly with the knowledge of the other disclaims to acknowledge
the trust and to hold under it, then the possession from that time
becomes adverse.
The act or disclaimer, however, which is thus to change the
character of the possession, should be clear, unequivocal, and distinctly brought to the knowledge of the other party.
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These views are fully recognised in the case of Tripe vs.
Marey, 39 N. H. 445, and cases cited; Willison vs. Watkins,
3 Peters 47-52; Zane vs. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. Rep. 576,
where the cases are ably reviewed and considered; Angell on
Lim. 161-174; Boone vs. Ohilds, 10 Peters 223; Livingston vs.
.Pendergast, 34 N. H. Rep. 551. See also Tellar vs. _Eckhert, 4
How. U. S. 289; Sherman vs. Champlain Trans. Co., 31 Verm.
162, and Attorney-General vs. Prop. of Meeting-House in _Federal Street, Boston, 3 Gray 1.
This doctrine was directly applied to the case of landlord and
tenant in Willison vs. Watkins, and to that of mortgagor and
mortgagee in Tripe vs. XMircy, and was recognised by both cases
as applicable to the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, and
to tenants in common, as it is also by Chancellor KENT in Kane
vs. Bloodgood. Some confusion has arisen upon the subject of
the Statute of Limitations, in respect to trusts, from the rather
loose-and inaccurate language of some of the earlier cases, from
which it has been laid down in general terms, that no length of
time bars the claim between the trustee and cestui que trust, as
in Bickford vs. Wade, 7 Sumner's Vesey 87, and note C.; but
upon a careful examination, the principle is found to apply only.
to those technical trusts which are the mere creatures of equity,
and not within the cognisance of courts of law at all ; but that
wherever the trusts are subject to remedy by action at law, the
Statute of Limitations will be applied in equity, the same as at
law: Kane vs. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. Rep. 576; Murray vs.
Costar, 20 Johns. Rep. 576.
Should the question of adverse possession arise upon another
trial, the inquiry would be whether the society under whom the
tenant claims has disavowed a holding under the trust, or set up,
a claim to the property adverse to the title of the town-and this
with a distinct knowledge on the part of the town of such disavowal or claim-and, if so, whether there has been since thak
time an uninterrupted occupation by the society or its tenant of'
the land.
Should it turn out, however, that the right originally vested ir
the town in its parochial character has passed to the incorporatecl
society, this question of adverse possession will not be material.
But it is contended that the case does not show that either thedefendant or his lessors ever claimed a freehold, and that this
possession must be regarded as subordinate to that of the town.
Vo,. XIL-26
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But, it seems that the Congregational Society, so far back as
1824, assumed the control of the parsonage, repaired and leased
it from time to time, down to the lease to defendant in 1853 ;
called meetings of the society, claiming to own it, and with articles in the warning of such meetings, respecting the sale or other
disposition of it, by the society ; and we are not prepared to say
there was not evidence from which the jury might have found an
occupation under claim of title by the society.
Nor do we understand it to be essential, that the possession to
be adverse should be under a claim of an estate equal to a freehold, but it is enough, we think, if the possession was under a
claim of title to the land, although the title claimed was merely
in trust for the use of the settled minister of that society for
ever, and with no claim of a right to dispose of the fee.
It is true that a person who is wrongfully in possession of the
land of another, cannot defeat a writ of entry by qualifying his
entry, and showing that le claimed less than a freehold; bft we
think that when there is an actual ouster, and the requisite
length of possession, it is a good bar to a writ of entry, although
the possession was under a claim of title to hold the land in trust
for another.
Upon these views the verdict directed by the court must
be set aside, and there must be a new trial.
The preceding case, which we have
received through the courtesy of Mr.
Justice BELLOWS, presents two points
of law, of great practical importance,
in a very clear and just light.
. I. How far one formal corporation or
organization can be treated, by way of
intendment and construction, as the
successor of a different corporation or
organization, still in existence, in consequence of the legal devolution of the
duties ofthe latter upon the former, without any specific statutory provision for
the succession of rights and duties. We
think there has generally obtained, in
the courts, a strictness of construction,
upon this point, very nearly approaching to refinement, and which this case
very happily illustrates and cures.
There is no sensible or technical rule,

whereby any doubt need arise, in regard to the question of the title of land
having passed from a town to a religious
society, where the grant was originally
made to the town in its parochial capacity, as for the support of a minister,
and where by act of the legislature all
the parochial functions of the town are
subsequently devolved upon the parish
organizations within the town, although
there is no specific legislative provision
to that effect. But we believe many
very able courts would have haggled
and stumbled upon the question, merely
from the habit of demanding some specific act of authority to pass the title
of land from any one person, natural
or corporate, to another, morethan from
any other cause. And even the Massachusetts courts, which appear to have
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presented to us, seem to have had somewhat more specific legislative authority
for it: Milton vs. The First Parish in
Milton, 10 Pick. R. 447; SniAw, C. 3.,
in The First Parish of Medford vs.
Medford, 21 Pick. R. 202-204.
But any such doubt, or hesitation,
would have proved peculiarly unfortunate, in the principal case, in consequence of the division of the original
town, and the particular religious .society falling within the limits of the
new town; and the act of division having no specific provision in regard to
the avails of this grant to the original
town. But for the practical and sensible construction here adopted, the fee
of the land might have been left in one
town, while a religious society situated
in another town would have been the
cestui que trust. How very much more
simple and reasonable is the construction here adopted; and when it is once
done, it can scarcely fail to provoke the
universal admiration of all lovers of
justice, base4 upon principles of law
evoked by natural inteudments and
sensible constructions. We scarcely
recollect any case, of late, where so
rational a theory has been brought
forward, to bridge over a chasm, which
a moderate share of antiquated refinement might have left quite impassable.
With such sober, thoughtful, and rational constructions as these to harmonize and perfect the unwritten law of
the land, the trade of cbde-makers will
soon be buried, where it ought to be,
in our humble judgment, beyond the
reach of line and plummet, in the bottomless ocean of hopeless experiments.
What could be more natural, or more
in conformity with the obvious purpose
of this grant, than to hold, that when
all parochial functions ceased in the
town, ad these same functions were by
legislative act transferred to a religious
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corporation created for the express purpose of carrying forward these functions, that this corporation thus became
the successor of the town, so far as its
parochial functions were concerned?
I. The other point to which we alluded is, that of the effect of lapse of
time, and acquiescence, upon charitable
trusts.,
1. It has long been well settled, that
no lapse of time will bar a court of
equity from reforming a clear breach
of trust in regard to public charitable
uses. This results not only from the
general power of courts of equity to
relieve against breaches of trust, without
regard to lapse of time, where the proof
is clear; but especially from thie supervisory power and responsibility of those
courts, in regard to public charities.
The statute of limitations is never any
absolute bar to relief in a court of
equity, where there has been either
fraud or breach of trust. And in regard to the perversion of a public charity, there is, more commonly, although
not always. both. But courts of equity
do not intend to establish such rules
of construction upon that point as to
invite stale claims before them. Hence,
in all cases, where there is concurrent
jurisdiction, both at law and in equity,
as in regard to certain frauds, and so
far as the legal title of property subject
to trusts is concerned, and in many
other cases, the statute of limitations
is considered as much a bar in a court
of equity as at law. And this is the
precise point ruled in the principal
case.
2. But it has long been regarded as a
difficult and delicate matter, to determine the precise weight to which lapse
of time and the acquiescence of counter
claimants are entitled, in determining
the character of, and the form of administering, trusts. The true rules
upon this question may be regard'ea as
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fairly stated by Lord Justice TunRNE,
in Attorney-General vs. Corporation of
Rochester, 5 De G., M. & G. 797, 822:
"Undoubtedly, if an instrument be
doubtful in its terms, contemporaneous
usage may be referred to ; and if there
has been a long usage in the application of funds to purposes which may
be warranted upon one construction of
the instrument, but which may not be
warranted upon another construction
of the instrument, the court will lean
to that construction of the instrument
(provided it be doubtful) which will
best correspond with the mode in which
the funds have been for so long a time
applied. But that is the case where
the trust is doubtful in its terms, and
interpretation.
If the court finds a
clear trust expressed in a will, no
length of time, during which there has
been a deviation from it, can warrant
this court, as I apprehend, in making
a decree in contradiction to such trust."
The same views are maintained by the
same learded judge, in Attorney-General vs. Beverly, 6 De G., Al. & G. 268.
And in The Attorney-General vs.
Federal Street Meeting-House, 3 Gray
1, it was held that in regard to property

given to maintain public worship in a
particular form, as they might be terminated by the unanimous consent of
the cestuis que trust, so where a claim

adversely to the trust had been set up
and maintained for forty years, it created an effectual bar against reinstating
the trust. Lord ELDON gave his full
concurrence in theseviews, in AttorneyGeneral vs. Bristol, 2 Jac. & W. 321,
and in the Same vs. Catherine Hall,
Jac. Rep. 381. And Lord ST. LtoxARDS, the best living equity authority,
confirms the same view, in very strong
language, in Mayor of South Molton vs.
Attorney-General, 5 Ho. Lds. Cas. 1.
And the same views are confirmed by
Lord CRANWORTH, in Attorney-General
vs. Dean and Canons of Windsor, 6 Jur.
N. S. 833, 843. The English cases are
very numerous where these views have
been maintained. And by statute 3 &
4 Win. 4, ch. 27, the attorney-general
is barred from interfering in the administration of a charity, after twenty
years' acquiescence: 4 De G. & 1.
136; Attorney-General vs. rayne, 27
Beavan 168. And ?he Dublin Case, 38
N. H. R. 459, has adopted similar views.
I. F. R.

In the Court of Appeals of New York.
ELIZABETH ANN WILCKENS ET AL., EXECUTORS, ETC., VS. JAMES S.
WILLET, ETC.
1. A sheriff is liable for the escape of a prisoner, committed to his custody on
final process in a civil action, unless it takes place through the act of God, or of
a public enemy, or through the act of the law.
2. It will be a sufficient defence by the sheriff to an action for escape, to show
that such prisoner was taken from his custody from the jail liberties, and at the
time of the commencement of th6 action was retained by the serjeant-at-arms
of the House of Representatives of the United States, by means of a warrant
issued by the House in due form of law, to cause the prisoner to be brought
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before it to answer for an alleged contempt against its authority, in failing to
obey its subpoena to appear and testify as a witness.
3. The proceeding on such a warrant is an "act of the law," and is embraced
within the exception to the sheriff's liability.
4. Itseems, that if the prisoner had left the jail liberties in obedience to the
subpoena, and had not been arrested on a warrant to answer for an alleged contempt, the sheriff would have been liable, as the prisoner would not have been in
the custody of the law.

John D. Williamson, for whose alleged escape this action was
brought, was imprisoned upon an execution duly issued against
his person in the city of New York, and had secured the right to
the jail liberties. While thus situated he was served with a subpcena, to attend and give evidence before the House of Representatives of the United States, or a committee thereofl, and failing to appear was adjudged guilty of contempt. A warrant in
the customary form was thereupon issued, and delivered to the
sergeant-at-arms, to arrest said Williamson and bring him before
the bar of the House to answer for the said contempt.
In pursuance of this warrant, the sergeant-at-arms, on the 2d
of February 1858, arrested Williamson within the jail liberties
and compelled him to go to Washington, and by virtue of the
said warrant, and before the bar of the said House, he was
detained upon said process until the 9th of the same month, when
he returned to the liberties of the said jail.
This action was commenced against the sheriff on the 5th of
February, and before the return of said prisoner.
CMarles P. Kirkland, for appellants.-Tbe power of either
House of Congress to issue subpcnas and compel obedience to
them in every part of the United States, as a general rule, is
admitted, but they have not the power by subpoena to compel the
attendance of a person lawfully imprisoned,and actually in confinement in any state on due legal process, civil or criminal. Williamson was, at the time of the service of the subpoena, in such actual
confinement, as isfound as a fact. Of this fact, the House of
Representatives or its officers had knowledge, or were legally
chargeable with knowledge, and not appearing in obedience to
the subpoena under the circumstances was not a contempt, and a
warrant founded on it was void. But assuming that the question
of contempt is res adjudicata, the House could not by their warrant give the sergeant any power or authority to take Williamson
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from his confinement in the jail, or on the jail liberties of the
city of New York.
If there were any mode by which the personal attendance of
Williamson before the House could, under these circumstances,
have been obtained, it was by the common law writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum. This writ, and the writ of habeag
corpus ad testificandum could both be executed in entire harmony
with the rights and laws of the state of New York, and of her
judicial tribunals; for in that case Williamson would have continually remained in the custody of the sheriff of N'Tew York
under his original imprisonment.
If at the time of issuing the warrant the House had no power
to issue any writ of habeas corpus, it is casus omissus, and shows
only that this is an exceptional case, in which the general power
to obtain testimony and punish for contempt cannot be carried
out.
For these reasons the act of the sergeant-at-arms was an act
of unauthorized force, and does not justify the sheriff.
Aaron J . Vanderpoel, for respondent.-The general principle
that a legislative body has the power of summoning witnesses,
and to punish summarily, as for a contempt, who ever shall disobey
its summons, has been so often judicially declared, that the point
ought not be deemed open for discussion. The courts of England
and America hold that this power exists; that the legislative
body is the proper and exclusive forum to decide when the contempt existed, and that the power to punish follows as a necessary inciden. to the power to take cognisance of the offence :
Story on Const., § 847; Brass Crosby's Case, 3 Wils. 188; s. c.,
19 State Trials 1138; s. c., 8 Id. 33; Burdett vs. Abbott, 14
East 1; Burdett vs. Coleman, 14 Id. 163; s. c., 5 Dow. Parl.
Rep. 165; Bolton vs. Martin, 1 Dall. 296 ; State vs. Matthews,
37 N. H. Rep. 450; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass. Rep. 1, 34, 35;
Rex vs. Flower, 8 T. R. 314 ; Robhouse Case, 3 B. & Ald.. 420;
Id., 2 Chitty's Rep. 207; Skewys' -Executors vs. Chamond,
Trewynard's Case, Dyer 59 b; Beaumont vs. Fletcher, 1 Moore's
Priv. Coun. Rep. 59; Cushing on Leg. Ass., § 930 et seq. ; Stockdale vs. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1; Sheriff of Middlesex, 11 Id.
273; Regina vs. Patty, 2 Ld. Raym. 1105; llfurray's Case, 1
Wils. 299.
The Act of Congress of May 3d 1798, is an express recogni-
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tion of the existence of the power to examine witnesses. By it,
authority is conferred upon the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, a Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole, or a Chairman of a Select Committee,
to administer oaths to witnesses in any case under their examination : 1 Stat. at Large 554 ; Act of January 24th 1857, 11 Stat.
at Large 155; Act of 1859, Mileage for summoning Witnesses.
The Statute of 1798 was passed because the practice of the Lords
and Commons was not uniform. In the House of Lords the witnesses were sworn, and gave their evidence under oath; the
Commons did not assert the right to administer an oath, and the
evidence was received without that sanction. The House of
Representatives, previous to the Act of 1798, had called to its
assistance one of the judges of the common law courts to administer the oath: Cushing on Leg. Assem., §§ 755, 756, 757;
House Joar., Vol. III., pp. 71, 154, 155, 158, 165. In no other
respect was any modification deemed necessary. The power was
acknowledged; it was in no sense limited.
The arrest of Williamson by the sergeant-at-arms, and compelling him to appear at the bar at the House of Representatives,
did not constitute an escape. He went in subjection to the law
of the land. It was, on the part of the House, a legitimate
exercise of the sovereign power of the General Government.
All contracts between individuals living under the same government are made subject to the exercise of its sovereign power.
The compulsory departure of a prisoner from the jail limits
under such authority is not a ;going at large," within the meaning of the statute. Subject to the execution of the warrant, he
still remains in the custody of the sheriff: 2 R. S.434, § 47 ; 3.
Id. 734, § 48 of 5th ed.
cc Being without the jail liberties" and cc going at large' are
pot synonymous.
Where a prisoner is taken out of the county on a habeas corpus
ad testificandum, it is not an escape, even though he is for a time
out of the view of the sheriff: Hassen vs. Griffin, 18 Johns. 48 ;
.Noble vs. Smith, 5 Johns. 857; Wattles vs. Marsh, 5 Cow. 176;
Martin vs. Wood, 7 Wend. 132.
When the presence of a party imprisoned in the King's Bench
prison on a ca. sa. was required in the Court of Chancery, the
chancellor granted a rule or order called a day writ, which permitted the prisoner to go without the bounds of the prison for
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one day. A departure from the liberties under such a rule was
not an escape: Rigault vs. Cloberry, Rep. in Chancery, 67;
Bouvier's Die., tit. Day Rule; Field vs. Jones, 8 East 151.
The House, having no power to issue the writ of habeas corpus
ad testificandum, is left to choose and resort to the process which
it is authorized to issue to its own officer, and which is paramount
to the same extent as a habeas corpus issuing from a court having
jurisdiction would be to the execution: Sec. 14, Judiciary Act
of 1787; 1 Stat. at Large 81.
From the relation in which the United States and the several
states stand to each other; it necessarily follows that the warrant
of the Speaker, issued by the authority of the Hous6, in a matter and
for a purpose within the jurisdiction of the House, and temporary
in its operation, is effectual to take a prisoner from the custody
of process issued by state tribunals, and detain him so long as
the specific purpose requires his presence. The General Government, while limited in its subjects of legislation, is, as to-all that
relates to carrying out its legislation upon those subjects,
supreme: Constitution, art. 1, § 8, art. 6 ; Story on Const.,
§ 363, &c., and notes; Duer on Const. Juris. 389; Colens vs.
State of Virginia, 6 Wheat. 381 ; Ableman vs. Booth, 21 How.
506, 516; McCullough vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405-9;
Tax Case, 23 N. Y. 199.
While we deny that Williamson's removal from the limits was
an escape, any more than it would have been if he had been
taken by the sheriff, under a writ of habeas corpus, to an adjoining county, yet if we regard it, for the purposes of this point, as
an escape, the sheriff is not liable for it. The general proposition is stated in the books, in speaking of the liability of the
sheriff for the safe.keeping of his prisoners, that nothing but the
act of God, or of the public enemies, will excuse an escape. It
is,'in this respect, likened to the liability of common carriers for
the safe carriage of goods: Fairchildvs. Case, 24 Wend. 381-3.
1. This general proposition has, however, from time to time
been declared to be subject to other qualifications.
(a) Where the escape is induced by artifice or fraud on the
part of the plaintiff: Dexter vs. Adams, 2 Denio 646; S. c.
How. Appeal Cases 771; Van Wormer vs. Van F7orst, 10
Wend. 356.
(b) So where the prisoner has availed himself of the right to
the jail liberties, as in the present case, it is held :-Where the
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departure from the limits was without any agency on the part of
the prisoner, he not consenting, and returning as soon as he had
the ability, the bondsmen are not liable: Baxter vs. Tuber, 4
Mass. 361; Allen on Sheriffs 231; Fuller vs. Davis, 1 Gray
612; 5 Dane's Abr. 290; Hazard vs. Hazard, 1 Paine C. C. R.
Where the sheriff is by law compelled to take a bond, in form
and substance prescribed by statute, and release his prisoner and
to look to the bond for his indemnity, he will not be liable for
an escape from the limits under circumstances which would exonerate the sureties from liability to him (unless the sheriff connived at or induced the escape).
(c)A person privileged from arrest may leave the jail, and the
sheriff is not liable for an escape: Ray vs. Hogeboorn, 11 Johns.
433.
(d) A prisoner who was on the limits was released by Act of
Assembly. The sheriff was sued for an escape. It was held not
to be an escape, the court giving as a reason, -the bail for the
limits could not help it :" Pitch vs. Badger, I Root 72; Mason
vs. flaille, 12 Wheat. 370. See 4th Kern 30.
(e) The act of the law excuses the performance of a condition:
People vs. Manning, 8 Cow. 297; Carpenter vs. Stevens, 12
Wend. 589 ; People vs. Bartlett, 3 Hill 570.
2. The act of the law will excuse an escape, as well as it will
excuse the non-performance of a contract by a common carrier:
Stiles vs. -Davis, 1 Black's Rep. 101 ; Chitty and Temple on
Carriers; Per Cur. Anglesea vs. Churchwardens of lugeley, 6
Q. B. 107, 114, 51 E. C. L. R.; Wynn vs. Shropshire Union
Go., 5 Exch. Rep. 420; Davis vs. Cary, 15 Q. B. 418, 425, 69
E. C. L. R.; Evans vs. Hutton, 4 M. & G. 954; Spenser vs.
Ghadwiek,'10 C. B. 521; Abbott on Shipping 740.
The reason given for the rule, that only the act or providence
of God, or of the public enemies, will excuse an escape, is, that
the sheriff or bail have their action against the prisoner, to recover
their damages, if the escape is his own act; and against any
other persons who, as wrongdoers, occasion it: Allen on Sheriffs
231, 232; Elliott vs. Duke of No2folk, 4 T. R. 789; Southeote's
Case, 4 Coke 84; Impey on Sheriffs 180. In the case before
the court, the reason of this rule for holding the sheriff liable
wholly fails, and, as a consequence, the rule is not applicable.
The violent or compulsory removal of the prisoner under the
warrant was not illegal. It was in obedience to legal and valid
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process. The government is not responsible for having caused
it; and the officers who executed the warrant, acting within the
regular discharge of their official duties, are not liable to us.
The House, having the right to require the witness to appear,
and having duly adjudicated that he was in contempt for not
appearing, had the exclusive right to determine the nature of the
process to be issued to compel his attendance.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOHNSON, J. (who after stating the principal facts proceeded):Was this an escape for which the sheriff was liable ?
Our statute provides (2 R. S. 437, § 63), that if any prisoner
committed to any jail, in execution in a civil action, or upon an
attachment for the non-payment of costs, shall go or be at large
without the boundaries of the liberties of such jail, without the
assent of the party at whose suit such prisoner was committed,
the same shall be deemed an escape of such prisoner, and the
sheriff having charge of such jail shall be answerable therefor to
such party for the debt, damage, or sum of money, for which
such prisoner was committed.
This section contains, in terms, no exception whatever. The
prisoner being thus at large without the boundaries of the liberties, it "shall be deemed an escape," and the sheriff shall be
liable. Such is the plain reading of the section, and if no exceptions are to be implied, but the language is to be held to apply to
any and every prisoner going or being thus at large, whether
voluntarily or involuntarily on the part of the prisoner or the
sheriff, this action must be regarded as well brought, and the
plaintiff entitled to recover without reference to the authority of
the Speaker's warrant, and of the officer by whom the prisoner
in question was taken without the boundaries of the jail liberties
in this case.
Section 61 of the same article of Revised Statutes provides, that
all prisoners committed to any jail upon process for contempt, or
committed for misconduct in the cases prescribed by law, shall be
actually confined and detained- within the jail, until they shall be
discharged by due course of law. It then provides, that if any
sheriff or keeper of a jail shall - permit or suffer any prisoner so
committed to such jail to go or be at large, out of his prison,
except by virtue of some writ of habeas corpus, or rule of court,
or in such other cases as may be provided by law," he shall be
liable to the party aggrieved for his damages sustained thereby.
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The exception here prescribed does not, it will be seen, embrace
the case of a person committed, as was the prisoner in question,
upon execution, and duly admitted to the liberties of the jail,
but is expressly limited to the case of " prisoners so committed,"
i. e., upon process for contempt or misconduct. But although the
exception specified in section 61 does not by its terms or intention
reach the case of the prisoner in question, it furnishes, I think,
an unmistakeable key to the true reading and interpretation of
section 63, and shows that the going or being without the liberties of the jail, provided for by that section, which was to be
deemed an escape, was by the act and upon the volition of the
prisoner, and not upon the compulsion of judicial process.
The object plainly was not to favor sheriffs holding prisoners
of this class, committed for contempt and misconduct in reference
to escapes, but to place them upon the same legal footing in
regard to escapes from the jail by such prisoners, ag that in which
they stood in respect to escapes by prisoners committed in execution
in civil actions. If the prisoner is without the liberties by virtue
of a valid legal process, which affords a complete justification to
the officer having him thus without, in charge, it is not deemed
an escape, and no action lies against the sheriff.
The general rule at common law seems to have been, that
nothing but the act of God, or the king's enemies, would excuse
the sheriff for an escape from prison by a prisoner committed in
execution. This was declared to be the rule by Lord LOUGHBOROUGH in Aleept vs. Eyles, 2 H. BI. 113. If the jail took fire,
and the prisoners by means thereof escaped, the sheriff was excused
if the fire was the act of God: Bacon's Abridgment, tit. .Escape in
Civil Case8, H.,i and in Southeote's Case, 4 Co. 84, it is laid down
as the rule, that 1,if traitors break a prison, it shall not discharge
the jailer, otherwise of the king's enemies of another kingdom ;
for in the one case he may have his reward and recompense, and
in the other not." The reason here given why the jailer should
not be liable in case the prison was broken by the king's enemies
of another kingdom, shows the cogency and soundness of the
exception to the general rule of the common law, which I regard
as well established in favor of sheriffs where the prisoner is without the prison or jail liberties, by virtue of some order of a court
or official of competent jurisdiction, or of some legal process
which affords a justification to the officer executing it, and against
whom the sheriff can have no -remedy and recompense." It has
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long been settled both here and in England, that taking a prisoner who was imprisoned on execution in a civil suit away
from the prison or the jail liberties, on a habeas corpus ad testificandum, to testify was no escape: Nfoble vs. Smith, 5 Johns.
357 ; Hassan vs. Griffin, 18 Id. 48; Wattles vs. Marsh, 5 Cowen
176; Martin vs. Wood, 7 Wend. 132; 3 Esp. Cas. 288 ; 8 Burr.
1440; 4 East 587. And so when the prisoner has been discharged from his imprisonment, by the order of a court or judicial
officer, it has been held a good defence for the sheriff in an action
for the escape, provided the court or officer making the order had
jurisdiction to make it, even though such order was erroneously
made and might be avoided: Cantillon vs. Graves, 8 Johns. 472;
Hart vs. Dubois, 20 Wend. 236. Otherwise, however, where the
order is void upon its face, or is granted by an officer who has no
jurisdiction in the matter: Bush vs. Pettibone, 4 Comst. 800;
Cable vs. Cooper, 15 Johns. 152. In Field vs. Jones, 9 East
151, the prisoner had signed his petition for the benefit of the
day rule, but left the King's Bench prison b~fore the sitting of
the court on the day on which the rule was granted. The rule
was granted in his favor upon the sitting of the court on that
day, but not until after the action for the escape was commenced
against the marshal. But the rule was held to cover the entire
day when grttited, and to be a justification to the marshal in the
action. It is-clearly enough to .jiistify the sheriff, to show that
the absence of the prisoner is in pursuance of lawful authority.
To constitute an escape there must be some agency of the prisoner employed, or some wrongful act by another against whom
the law gives a remedy: Allen on Sheriffs 231; Baxter vs. Taber,
4 Mass. 361; Oaryll vs. Taylor, 10 Id. 206. Whenever the
principal by the act of God, or of the law, is taken out of the
bail's keeping, or as it were before the day of surrender and without fault in the bail, they are discharged: 5 Dane's Ab. 290 ;
Way vs. Wright, 5 Met. 380; Fuller vs. Davis, 1 Gray 612;
and it has been held, that a person privileged from arrest may
leave the jail without the sheriff's being liable for an escape : Ray
vs. Hogeboom, 11 Johns. 433; and so where lie has been released
by act of the legislature: Mason vs. Haille, 12 Wheat. 370.
These cases and many more which might be cited, show clearly,
that the act of the law, as well as the act of God, or of the public enemies,--will excuse a sheriff in an action for an escape ; and
that absence from the jail or the jail liberties, by such means, or
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from such causes, by the prisoner, is not within the contemplation of the statute, and is not the going or being at large
referred to in section 63.
The question then arises, whether the prisoner in this case was
removed from the jail liberties to Washington, by authority of law
or legal process. This authority must, I apprehend, be paramount to that under which the person so removed is held, in order
to justify the removal ; or at all events, of such a nature that the
officer or person effecting the removal could justify under it, in
case of an action brought against him by the sheriff for taking
his prisoner out of his custody. Any extended examination of
the question of the general power of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress to subpoena witnesses to testify before it or before one of its committees, and to compel their
attendance from any portion of the territorial limits of the United
States, is rendered unnecessary in this case, by the full and unreserved concession of the learned counsel for the plaintiff of
the existence of such a power in that body. That the power
exists there admits of no doubt whatever. It is a necessary
incident to the sovereign power of making laws, and its exercise is often indispensable to the great end of enlightened,
judicious, and wholesome legislation. The power is rather
judicial in its nature, but in a legislative body exists as an
auxiliary to the legislative power only. In the earlier history
of the country from which our institutions both of law and
legislature are principally derived, judicial and legislative functions existed in, and were exercised by, the same body; and
when they were afterwards separated and each came to be exercised by a separate tribunal or body, the legislative body necessarily retained a sufficient amount of the judicial power to enable
it to investigate fully and to comprehend thoroughly, any and
every subject upon which the body proposed to act in its legislative capacity. This includes the power to subpcena witnesses to
give evidence, to compel them to attend and testify, and to punish for disobedience and contempt in refusing to attend, or in
refusing to testify upon attendance. The power to punish for
disobedience and contempt is a necessary incident to the power
to require and compel attendance. This is not denied by the
plaintiff's counsel. He contends, however, that the only way in
which the attendance of Williamson before the House of Representatives could have been lawfully enforced and secured was, by
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habeas corpus to testify or to answer for the contempt. This is
unquestionably the mode provided by-law, where a witness imprisoned on civil execution is required to give evidence before a
court or to answer there for a contempt. Our statute, 2 R. S. 559,
sections 1 to 5 inclusive, provides for such cases, where the person is brought up on such process either to testify or to answer
for a contempt. The prisoner is to be remanded after having
testified, and if any order of commitment is made against him, it
must be to the prison from which he was taken: The People vs.
Rogers, 2 Paige 203. The statute however only relates to actions
and proceedings in courts, and not to proceedings before legislative bodies. In regard to those bodies, if their practice is not
regulated by any statute, they are to proceed according to their
customary rules and practice. It is not denied in this case that
Williamson, the prisoner, was taken before the House of Representatives on the occasion in question, upon the regular and customary process used by that body to bring persons to its bar, who
had refused to obey the subpcena to appear and testify, and had
been adjudged in contempt, for which they are required to answer.
The warrant issued gave the sergeant-at-arms the right to take
the person of Williamson into his custody, and convey him to
Washington, to answer and purge his contempt if he could. It
cannot be denied that, while he was thus in the custody of the
sergeant-at-arms under this warrant, and while he was before the
House until his discharge, he was in the custody of the law. The
question then arises, whether he was at large during this time,
within the meaning and intention of the statute so as to constitute
an escape. I am clearly of the opinion that he was not. He
was without the jail and the jail liberties it is true, but he was
still in the custody of the law, and was absent for a cause or purpose for which the policy of the law allows prisoners to be absent
temporarily, provided they are still in the custody of the law.
It was no more an escape than it would have been had the prisoner been without the liberties on habeas corpus. The law
allows a creditor in certain cases to confine the person of his
debtor within the jail or the jail liberties, in order to coerce him
into paying the debt. But it does not allow him to continue this
confinement at the particular place, to the obstruction of the due
course of justice in other cases. He may be taken to other
places to give evidence, or to answer for his contempts, and so
long as he is kept for this purpose by judicial process, and is not

WILCKENS ET AL. vs. WILLET.

given his liberty to go as he will, it is no escape. The prisoner
in question was taken to Washington for a legitimate purpose.
He must be deemed to have been a material witness before the
House of Representatives, and that body had power to compel
his attendance, and to punish him as for.a contempt in case of
his neglect or refusal to attend and testify. They had jurisdiction in the premises, and issued their customary warrant. The
prisoner was arrested and taken away and detained under it.
The plaintiff's counsel concedes that the prisoner might have
been lawfully taken on a habeas corpus, but insists, that inasmuch
as he was taken upon a different process, though for a legitimate
purpose, he was unlawfully without the limits as respects the
plaintiff. But it is clear that the prisoner himself could not
resist the sergeant-at-arms with his warrant. He was obliged to
go in the custody of that officer. True, he might purge or excuse
the alleged contempt, by showing that he was imprisoned and
could not obey the subpcena, and by giving his testimony according to the. requirements of the just process, but he could not
refuse to attend according to the exigency of the warrant.
Nor do I think the sheriff could have resisted the taking. The
prisoner was out upon the liberties on bail, and not otherwise in
th sheriff's custody. And suppose the sheriff bad sued the sergeant-at-arms for taking the prisoner from the jail liberties, I
do not see how he could have recovered. That officer could, I
assume, have justified under his process. It is to be presumed
that it was fair on its face, and was issued by a body having
jurisdiction, and for a lawful object even against one:imprisoned.
It seems to me clear, therefore, that Williamson, the prisoner,
was taken by authority of law, and in a manner which gave the
sheriff no remedy or recompense against the officer taking him.
It is of no consequence, as it seems to me, that the warrant was
not in the form of a writ of habeas corpus. That is strictly a
judicial writ. It is not a process which the body requiring the
testimony of the witness could issue. Its process is the subpmna
and the warrant which were issued. It issued the only process
it had or could issue. The House might perhaps in some form
have applied to some court of competent jurisdiction, if one could
be found, for a writ of habeas corpus to bring the witness before
it to testify, or to answer for a contempt, though, I think, under
our complex system, some serious difficulties might have been
found in the way of obtaining any such process. That seems to
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be the practice in England, where persons imprisoned on civil
process are required as witnesses to testify before the House of
Commons or its committees. But there it seems to be mere mat-.
ter of practice, as in the m-atter of Sir Edtpard Prince, a prisoner, 4 East 587, who was confined in Ilchester jail, by virtue
of a commitment of the Court of King's Bench, for non-payment
of a fine imposed as part of the judgment in a case of assault and
battery. The prisoner was a material witness upon a question
before the House of Commons, and the Speaker had issued his
warrant to bring up the witness by the day appointed. But in
order to obviate any difficulty, which the jailer might make to
suffer the prisoner to go out of confinement without the authority
of the court, application was made to the court for a habeas corpus
ad testificandum, to being up the prisoner before the committee
of the House. The court at first entertained doubts of the propriety of such an application, of which they did not recollect any
pTpcedent, but after some hesitation, granted the rule to show
cj.e, and aftwrwards, upon the applicant's undertaking to be at
the expense of bringing the witness up and returning him to custoy, made the rule absolute. This is understood to be the practj.e now in Great Britain, in cases where witnesses are required,
lhefore either House. of Parliament who are imprisoned. But the
'pplication in that case seems to have been made for more abundvnt: caution, and to 4void all difficulty with the jailer, and not fo*
ilant of power in the House of Commons to bring the witness up
uu4er its warrant. It is obvious that there is far less difficulty
i.qqnoh a practice in. England, than in this country with its
national and state legislature@, and courts exerising separate and
distinct jurisdictions.
No such practice has ever, that I am aware of, been adopted in
thia country, and I do not regard it as a vital question in the
se. If it is a mere question of practice, as I think it is, it in
n respect affects the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives.
]f , t4at body had the right to have the prisoner before it temporxily for such a purpose that is enough, and the mere form of
' the process upon which he was taken is not material, provided
tih object appeared substantially upon its face, and it was issued
b..onmpetent authority: Wattle# vs. Llarh, supra.
4 the view I take of this case, it is not necessary to decide
*]etlher the Congress of the United States possesses certain.
lqwers superiDr to state laws, bv,which itcan override such laws,
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or deprive creditors of rights secured by them. I do not suppose
that Congress has any such right which it can exercise arbitrarily
or capriciously, or in any way except in the exercise of some
power expressly granted by the Constitution of the United States,
or of some power which belongs as a necessary incident to a
clearly granted power. It is enough, however, for this case to
hold that either House of Congress has at least as much right to
have an imprisoned witness before it, for the purpose of giving
evidence where deemed necessary, as any party can have in an
action in a court of justice, and that creditors hold their imprisoned debtors subject to the right of temporary removal for the
purpose of testifying in the one case as much as in the other. I
do not think a witness thus in execution could be allowed on a
mere subpoena to leave the jail or the jail liberties, for the purpose of giving evidence at some other place, without rendering
the sheriff liable for an escape, for the plain reason that a witness
out in pursuance of such a process, would clearly be at large within
the meaning of the statute, not being in the custody of any officer,
or of the law. The subpoena does not authorize any one to take
the witness into custody or to detain him for any purpose, and of
course he would be at large without restraint. But not so when
taken upon a habeas corpus to testify, or by virtue of an attachment or a warrant to answer for an alleged contempt. He is in
the custody of the law when held for such a purpose until regularly discharged, and is not at large in that sense which is necessary to constitute an escape. Here the action was commenced
while the prisoner was in custody under the Speaker's warrant,
and several days before he was discharged. Neither the sheriff
nor his bail could have retaken him while thus held in custody,
and the sherif most clearly was in no respect to blame, for the
prisoner's absence from the jail liberties. He could not help it.
The action was therefore commenced before there was any escape,
and while the prisoner was in the custody of the law for a perfectly legitimate purpose. Having been commenced before any
cause of action had accrued, the action cannot be maintained. It
is in no respect material to the case, whether Williamson, the
prisoner, had been guilty of a contempt, or, in other words,
whether he had a valid excuse for not obeying the mandate of the
subpoena. It is enough that he was charged with a contempt, and
was taken into the custody of the officer of the body making the
charge, on a regular process which compelled him to appear and
VOL. XIII.-27
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answer the charge. The judgment of the House on the question
of contempt cannot be examined or reviewed here. It does not
distinctly appear from the facts found, when Williamson was
released from the custody of the sergeant-at-arms, whether at
Washington or in New York. Nor is it material, as the fact is
found that he was not released until the 9th of February, four days
after the action had been commenced. It appears that Williamson did in fact as soon as he was released return to the liberties
of said jail. The question whether the release of Williamson at
Washington, and hit voluntary return without restraint or compulsion to New York, would have constituted an escape, is not
presented by the facts found, and it is unnecessary to pass upon
it. 'An escape after the action was commenced would not save it,
if there was no cause of action at the time of its commencement.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the judgment is right, and
should be affirmed.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
PHYSICK'S ESTATE.

APPEAL OF THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY FOR
INSURANCE ON LIVES, ETC.

1. Marriage is a civil contract and nothing more. It may may be presumed
from cohabitation and reputation. It may be established by proof of the declarations and admissions of the parties.
2. Although the intercourse was originally meretricious, it is not necessary to
show when it ceased to be meretricious and became matrimonial.
.8. A counter-presumption may be established by proof of subsequent matriXaonial cohabitation and reputation, and declarations of the husband.
4. Where conflicting presumptions exist, those in favor of matrimony and
Innocence must prevail.

Emlen Physick, the testator, died on the 24th of April 1859.
By his will, which bears date the 11th of April 1857, he gives to
Frances Mlary Parmentier, so long as she shall remain single and
unmarried, the annuity or annual sum of $2000, during the term
of her natural life, or so long as she shall remain single and unmarried. The residue of his estate the testator devises to his executors, in trust "for the maintenance and eflucation of my son Emlen
Physick (a child by Frances Mary Parmentier) during his minority (which child I have caused to be legitimatized by an Act of
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania)."

PHYSICK'S ESTATE.

The remaining provisions of the will have no particular bearing
upon the case in hand.
On the 7th of April 1858, Mr. Physick executed a codicil to
his will, in which he says: "there having been, since the making
of my last will, born of Frances Mary Parmentier, in said will
mentioned, a female child named Ellen Elizabeth, I do hereby
declare the said Ellen Elizabeth to be my child, and as such she
is to be entitled to the benefit of the fifth provision of my said
last will, made and provided with respect to any after-born child
of mine by the said Frances Mary Parmentier."
Two children, Emlen and Ellen Physick, and their mother, the
said Frances Mary Parmentier, survived the testator, and are
still living. The lady who is named in the will as Frances Mary
Parmentier, claimed that she was the lawful wife of the testator,
and as such filed her refusal to take the legacies and provisions
made for her in the will, and elected to take her share as widow
under the intestate laws of Pennsylvania.
She also filed a bill to perpetuate testimony in -the Supreme'
Court of Pennsylvania, in which the executors were made defendants.
Before the auditor, the claim of Frances Mary Parmentier,
styling herself Mrs. Physick, to one-third of the balance for distribution, as widow of the testator, was formally made by her
counsel, and a large amount of testimony taken, establishing
among others the following facts:Frances M. Parmentier had been married to a Mr. Sawtell, but
obtained a divorce in 1851. The costs in this case were paid by
Emlen Physick.
About the 1st of January 1852, Mr. Physick rented a house
in Juniper street, in which the claimant afterwards resided. The
rent of this house was paid by Mr. Physick; he supplied it with
the necessaries of life, and passed the greater part of his time
there, though his residence was in Spruce street.
On the 5th of November 1852, the claimant bore Mr. Physick
a daughter, who was named Susan Emlen Physick.
In April 1853, the house in Juniper street was given up, and
the claimant and the child went "to reside with Mr. Physick in
his house in Spruce street, which was still kept open by him.
-About 1854, they removed to a house at the corner of Fitzwater
and Erie streets, where a son was born to them named Emlen
Physick. It does not exactly appear when they left Fitzwater
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street, but in 1856 they resided together in a house in South
street, between Ninth and Tenth streets, owned by Mr. Physick.
In 1856, probably in November, but the precise date was not
shown, a paper was handed by Physick to the claimant, for signature, with the remark, that " it was an application for legitimatizing the child named." She signed the paper, but it was not
produced in evidence. The testator then prepared a formal petition to the legislature of this state, which was signed by him
alone, and was sworn to by him on the 8th of November 1856.
In this document he states, that he -,ha8 never been married,"
has two children-naming them- both by Frances Mary Parmentier, and toth illegitimate," and prays for an act " making them
legftimate to the fullest extent, as if born in lawful wedlock."
On the 16th of December 1856, the eldest child, Susan, died
suddenly of scarlet fever, and Mr. Physick added a note to the
petition stating the death, and confining the application .to Emlen,
the son.
An Act of Assembly "legitimating Emlen Physick," was
passed by the legislature in accordance with the prayer of the
petition, and approved on the 7th of January 1857.
About 1854 the testator had spoken to an acquaintance (Cummings) of his , wife and baby," and there is evidence (Trout,
'Stephens, Ralston, Dr. Doran, Harmer, and Parvin's testimony),
that in 1856 and 1857, perhaps in 1854 and 1855, the parties
lived and cohabited together as man and wife, and were so reputed.
On the 11th of April 1857, Mr. Physick executed his will, the
provisions of which have been already sufficiently recited.
On the 1st of the same month of April, Mr. Physick procured
a passport from the State Department at Washington, for - Emlen
Physick, accompanied by his wife and son."
This was obtained in contemplation of a voyage to Europe, and
on the 18th of April he went to New York, accompanied by the
claimant and his son Emlen, and put up at the Astor House in
that city. He registered his arrival at the hotel as ,,Emlen
Physick, lady and servant."
le embarked for Liverpool on the
14th of April, and during the voyage treated and spoke of the
claimant as his wife. In London the parties lived together as
man and wife, and the servants addressed the claimant as Mrs.
Physick.
On the 6th of August, while still in Europe, a daughter of the
parties was born, and named Ellen Elizabeth.
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In October they returned to America. During the voyage,
Mr. Physick entered his own name on the customary list of passengers, and immediately under it the names of the claimant and
of the children, with the mark of ditto under the name of Physick. He introduced the lady to the purser of the steamer as his
wife, and spoke of her as such in various ways. On arriving at
New York, on the 25th of October 1857, he again went to the
Astor House, and entered on the register there, - Mr. and Mrs.
Physick, two children, and nurse."
In the same year, after his return, be rented a house in Tenth
street. In negotiating for the lease, he spoke of the claimant as
his wife, and introduced her as such to the landlady. To another
witness, he said that he married a lady in this city, and that he
did not marry in Europe ; and that the reason why he had not
published his marriage was, that his family was opposed to it. He
stated that he would bring his wife to see the house, and did
bring the claimant.
On the 7th of April 1858, Mr. Physick executed the first codicil to his will, already recited, in which he states that there has
been born of Frances Mary Parmentier a female child, named
Ellen Elizabeth, whom he declares to be his child, and, as such,
entitled to the provision for after-born children, in his will.
In the summer of 1858, Mr. Physick, with the claimant and
children, went to Cape May, where he rented a cottage. He
introduced the claimant to the proprietor of the cottage as Mrs.
Physick ; spoke of her as his wife ; and they lived together as
man and wife, and were reputed there to be such.
After the return of the parties from Europe, several witnesses
testify to their living and cohabiting together as man and wife ;
to Mr. Physick's introducing the claimant as his wife; to her
being addressed as Mrs. Physick in his presence; and to their
being reputed to be man and wife.
.T. Thomas, on behalf of the claimant.-Marriage is a civil
contract, which requires no proof of ceremony, but may be inferred from the acts of the parties, and such inference must be
drawn from the testimony in the present case: Guard. of Poorvs.
Nathans, 5 Penna. L. J. 1; Forney vs. Jlallacker, 8 S. & R. 159;
Chambers vs. -Dickson, 2 Id. 475; Senser vs. Bower, 1 Penna.
Rep 450; In re Taylor, 9 Paige 611; Bose vs. Clark, 8 Id.
574; Penton vs. Reed, 4 Johns. 53 ; Cunningham vs. Cunningham, 2 Dow. 483; Carr vs. King, 12 Mod. 372; Longfoot vs.
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1yler, 1 Salk. 112; Boulton vs. Prentiss, 2 Id. 1214; Jackson
vs. Claw, 18 Johns. 348; Newburyport vs. Boothby, 9 Mass. 415;
King vs. Twining, 2 B. & Ald. 385; 1 Bouvier's Law Dic. 274;
3 Stark. Ev. 1248; 2 Phil. Ev. 462-3; 1 Green. Ev. §§ 27, 107,
207; 2 Id. 462; 1 Black. Com. 433; Tomlinson vs. Tomlinson,
MS. C. P. Phila. Co. September 1834, 149.
St. C. T. Campbell, for the executors.-Marriage, though
called a civil contract, is much more. With many elements of
such a contract, it has many inconsistent with it. Thus, a marriage on Sunday, or by an infant, would be good. Every other
contract may be dissolved by act of parties. No other contract
can'be dissolved by the legislature. It differs from other contracts :-st.
In the way of making it; 2d. In the way of dissolving it; 3d. In the rights and obligations pending it ; and 4th.
In requiring more solemnity.
Marriage he defined to be a civil status, existing betwden one
man and one woman, legally united for life, for those civil and
social purposes which are based upon the distinction of sex.
The authorities, he said, divided themselves into two heads:
1st. Where the question arises between the husband and third
parties; and 2d. Between the husband and wife. In the first
'instance, a man may be responsible to others for the violation of
truth' in falsely holding out a person to be his wife, as he may
be responsible for falsely declaring himself a partner or possessor
of personal property, when not the owner of it. The case of
Savilla .Nathans, 5 Penna. L. J. 1, and others cited by the
counsel for the claimant, did not, therefore, apply.
He further argued, that between party and party, proof may
be maide of the fact of marriage itself, or by a necessary presumption in favor of innocence. In the present case, an irresistible inference was to be drawn from the want of any proof of the
fact. If the presumption of innocence be once rebutted, and the
original relation between the parties shown to be criminal, proof
of the fact of marriage becomes vital, because the case is then
shown to be unworthy of the protection of the law, and the indirect proof may be consistent with the want of innocence in the
connection.
The Act of Assembly showed that there bad been no marriage
when it was passed. The evidence was the same after the date
of the Act as before it, which showed that the relation had not
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been changed. What the auditor believed to be the truth, was
the question. The absence of actual proof of marriage, and the
direct proof of want of innocence, were conclusive.
The auditor, JOSEPH A. CLAY, Esq. (after stating the facts in
detail, which have been condensed above), proceeded to. report as
iollows:"In this Commonwealth, marriage in its legal aspect is emphatically a civil contract and nothing more. The precepts of
religion and morality may add to its solemnity, but they have
nothing to do with its civil obligation. Even the restrictions
arising from consanguinity, or from a prior existing engagement
of the same nature, or from other incapacities to contract, derive
their legal validity from the enactments which follow the dictates
of religion, and not from those dictates themselves. The essence
of the engagement consists in a consent freely given by parties
competent at the time to contract: 2 Kent's Com. 86 ; Hantz vs.
Seely, 6 Binn. 405, &c.
"cHowever, therefore, marriage may differ in some particulars
from other contracts, as in being valid between infants, or when
made on Sunday, or in b.eing dissoluble by legislative enactment
and not by consent of parties merely, it is still to be proved in
civil cases, as all other contracts are, by direct proof of execution,
by admission of parties, especially against interest,, and by inference from circumstances peculiarly belonging to the conjugal
relation; and it may be proved, as other contracts generally cannot be proved, by public reputation.
" It is familiar law, that reputation and cohabitation are sufficient evidence of marriage in Pennsylvania for all civil purposes:
Chambers vs. Dickson, 2 S. & R. 475; Covert vs. .Hertzog, 4
Barr 135; Thorndell vs. Aiorrison, 1 Casey 326, &c. The declarations and admissions of the parties are at least of equal'
force: Hill vs. Hill's Administrators, 8 Casey 511 ; Kenyon vs.
Ashbridge, 11 Id. 157; Guardiansof Poorvs. Nathans, 5 Penna.
L. J. 1; Hanna vs. Phillips, 1 Grant 253, &c.; and this is the
case even in some actions of a criminal nature: Porney vs. Hallacher, 8 S. & R. 159.
-The admissions of parties in this instance, as in all others,
come within the class of direct'proofs. If once established, they
are of great weight, especially when made under circumstances
which are against the interest, or may be turned to the disadvantage, of the party by whom they are made. Like other direct
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proof, they can only be repelled by superior proof of the same
nature, amounting to a contradiction.
- The proof from circumstances, such as reputation, conduct;
and cohabitation, is presumptive and inferential. As with other
presumptions, it may be rebutted by showing inconsistent circumstances, or such as lead to a contrary presumption: 2 Greenl.
Ev., § 462, 464; Covert vs. Hertzog, 4 Barr 135, &c.
- The general and ordinary presumption of the law is in favor
of innocence, in questions of marriage, and of legitimacy, where
children are concerned. Cohabitation is presumed to be lawful
till the contrary appear. Where, however, the connection be-*
tween the parties is shown to have had an illicit origin, and to be
criminal in its nature, the law raises no presumption of marriage:
2 Kent 87; Jackson vs. Claw, 18 Johns. Rep. 346; 2 Greenl.
Ev., § 464, &c.; and in Scotland, it seems, it is to be presumed
that the guilty connection continued: Cunningham vs. Cunningham, 2 Dow. 501, 502; Shelford on Marriage 99, and cases cited.
In cases, moreover, of conflicting presumption on the subject of
legitimacy, that in favor of innocence must prevail: Senser vs.
Bower, 1 Penna. Rep. 450.
"cSome of the cases on the subject of this class of presumptive
evidence are remarkable, and have a direct bearing on the present case.
c In Fenton vs. Reed, 4 Johns. 51, Elizabeth Guest was the wife
of John Guest in 1785. Guest was absent about seven years
afterwards, and was reported to be dead. In 1792, Mrs. Guest
married Reed, and in the same year Guest returned. He died
in 1800. Reed and his wife lived and cohabited together as man
and wife until 1806, when Reed also died. After his death, his
widow brought suit against a provident society, of which he was
a member, and the defence rested on the invalidity of the marriage. There wag no direct proof of a marriage after Guest's
death, but the court held that, though the original marriage with
Reed was void, because the first husband was living, yet the
reputation and cohabitation after he died were sufficient to warrant the jury in inferring a subsequent marriage.
,This case is affirmed in Jackson vs. Claw, 18 Johns. 345.
" Rose vs. Clark, 8 Paige 474, was a case where Abigail Rose
had been married several times. Her first and second husbands
deserted her; and the first husband, Frink, survived until after
her final marriage with Rose. After the death of Frink there
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was no proof of re-marriage, but Rose cohabited with her, and
acknowledged her as his wife.
" The court say: 'The only doubt in this case arises from the
proof of the fact that the matrimonial cohabitation between these
parties commenced previous to the death of the first husband,
under a contract of marriage which was absolutely void, although
neither of them may have known, at that time, that Frink was
still living. It appears, however, from decisions in our own
courts, as well as in England, that a subsequent marriage may
be inferred from acts of recognition, continued matrimonial cohabitation, and general reputation, even Wizen the parties originally came together under a void contract of marriage.'
"4Fenton vs. Reed and Jackson vs. Claw are affirmed, and the
court further say, 'the mere fact of a man and woman living
together, and carrying on an illicit intercourse, is wholly insufficient to raise a legal presumption of marriage, as it too often
happens that such cohabitation .takes place when the intercourse
between the parties is clearly meretricious. The presumption of
marriage only arises from matrimonial cohabitation ; where the
parties not only live together as husband and wife, but hold
themselves out to the world as sustaining that honorable relation
to each other.'
, The chancellor also says that he agrees with the opinions in
Cunningham vs. Cunningham, 2 Dow. P. 0. 482. This was a
Scottish case, in which a marriage was attempted to be proved
by certificate, by 'habit and repute,' and by declarations of the
husband. The alleged wife had died, and the proceedings were
instituted by her children, in whose success the father was interested. The original connection was shown to have been grossly
immoral; the certificate was impeached for fraud; and the testimony of the witnesses as to reputatibn was contradictory. The
acknowledgments of the husband were open to suspicion, from
the circumstances under which they were made, and from his
interest.
"The commissioners pronounced in favor of the marriage, and
the Court of Sessions affirmed their decision by a bare majority.
On appeal to the House of Lords this judgment was reversed.
Lord ELDON said (p. 502), that.,the presumption was in favor of
the legality of the connection ; but where it clearly appeared that
it was at first illicit, that the man had expressed doubts whether
the child was his own, such a connection was likely to continue
illicit.' ' There may be cohabitation between a man and woman
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without its being a cohabitation as husband and wife. It was
said to have become lawful at some period, none knew when.
Afterwards it became. the husband's interest to set up the marriage. His declarations were, therefore, of no weight.'
"Lord REDESDALE said (p. 514): ,The repute of marriage
must be general. The conduct of parties must be such as to
make almost every, one infer that they were married. Here the
connection had been long illicit, and it did not appearwien it
became lawful.'
- In Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468, an English marriage
was illegal, from the infancy of the husband. When he came
of age his wife was on her death-bed, and she died in three weeks
aftekwards. On the ground of cohabitation, and treatment as
man and wife, the jury presumed a marriage subsequent to the
arrival of the husband at full age, and the court sustained the
veidict.
"enser
S
vs. Bower, 1 Penna. Rep. 432, also requires notice.
There was proof, by reputation and cohabitation, of a marriage
between Jacob and Catharine Kitelinger. They lived together
for years, and had two children, when Kitelinger went to the
West, where he remained for seven years, and was reported to
have died. There was then similar evidence of marriage between.
C0atharine Kitelinger and Daniel Zinn. About a year after this
alleged marriage Kitelinger returned. Catharine left Zinn, and
lived with Kitelinger, as his wife, until her death. In an ejectment by a daughter of the marriage with Zinn, GIBSON, 0. J.,
said (p. 402): 'There is said to be the same evidence of a precedent marriage of the i~other with another man, who was alive
at her second marriage, and hence a supposed dilemma; but the
proof being equal, the presumption is in favor of innocence, and
so far is this carried in the case of conflicting presumptions, that
the one in favor of innocence must prevail.' Upon this ground,
and in consideration of the long separation from the first husband,
the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed.
-In a very recent English case, Goodman vs. Goodman, 28
Law J. Rep. 745, there was proof of a marriage by reputation
and cohabitation, by the admission of the husband under oath,
and by the baptism of children. This was sought to be rebutted
by proof of declaration by the husband, that he had not been
married ; by the refusal of his family to recognise his marriage,
and by the terms of his will, where the children were not acknowledged to be legitimate, but so named as to lead to a contrary
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inference. There was also some proof of an original illicit intercourse. The Vice-Chancellor STUART decided, that there was
not sufficient evidence to counteract the presumption of marriage
arising from the proof in support bf it, and he cited Doe vs.
Pleming, 4 Bing. 266, to show that 'the burthen of proof to
rebut such a presumption rested entirely on those parties who
disputed the marriage.' This decision was affirmed by the Lords
Justices, KNIGHT BRUCE and TURNER, on appeal.
"The last decision to which the auditor will refer, is that In
re Taylor, 9 Paige 611, a case which bears great analogy to that
under consideration.
" There"was strong proof of marriage between Taylor and his
wife, by cohabitation, public recognition by himself and the children of a former marrijige, and by entry of the births of the
children of the second marriage, by Taylor, in a family register.
Afterwards he left his wife for a long period, and finally became
insane. Some of the children by the first wife alleged that the
second connection was illicit. They produced a letter of Mrs.
Taylor, which was said to admit that she had never been married;
and they also produced a mutilated declaration of their father,
after the separation, to the same effect.
,The court held, that the facts were sufficient to authorize any
court or jury to presume a marriage between the parties, 'even
if there was reason to believe that an illicit connection had before
existed between them.' The declarations made after the cohabitation had terminatefl, were rejected as not contemporaneous.
,Other cases might be cited, but these are sufficient to establish the principles of law which govern the case. It remains to
apply these principles to the testimony.
" The divorce from Sawtell was obtained in October 1851. The
proof that Mr. Physick advanced the costs of the proceeding is,
of itself, quite as consistent with a design of marriage as with an
illicit intention; but, taken in connection with the subsequent circumstances, it undoubtedly favors the latter conclusion.
,The conclusive proof of this, however, is to be found in the
act of legitimation of Emlen Physick. This child was born on
the 25th of June 1855, and the act was passed on the 7th of
January 1857. It proves absolutely the view of the connection
that Physick held, or which he wished to be held, at the time.
As to the claimant, nevertheless, its chief force depends upon
the application for the act, which she admits that she signed, but
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which has not been produced. Without this admission, her
acquiescence in the enactment of the law, and her subsequent
cohabitation with Physick, without protest, would be strong circumstances against her, but they could not have the weight of a
direct consent to the proceeding. This consent, however, cannot
be pressed too far. The petition of Mr. Physick alone, which
seems to have been substituted for the joint one, not only states
that the birth of the child was illegitimate, but that he himself
had never been married. This allegation is important, for, if true,
it shows that there had been no marriage down to the date of the
petition itself; while the mere declaration that the child was
base-born, only shows that there had been no marriage at the
date of the birth. The weight of the intermediate testimony, as
to admissions and reputation, depends uipon which of the two
dates is assumed as the period to which this decisive proof of
absence of marriage refers. Now, while the acquiescence of the
lady is conclusive on this point, at the first date, it requires, to
make it conclusive as to the second date, that it should be shown
that the allegation of no marriage, up to that time, was contained
in the petition which she signed, but which is said to have been
lost. Without this proof, the intermediate testimony must be
allowed some weight, and cannot be wholly disregarded, as referring to a date certainly prior to the marriage.
"The first testimony in point of time is that of Dr. Doran.
He visited the parties when they lived in Spruce street in 1853,
and in Fitzwater street (where the child wasborn), and he visited
for a week at their house in South street, with his wife and
family, before the voyage to Europe. He says that 'they were
reputed as living together as man and wife.' Part of this evidence relates to a time prior to the birth of the child, and part
to a time between the birth and legitimation.
"The testimony of Stephens, Ralston, Cummings, and Harmer is in the same category. In 1854, Physick spoke to Cummings of his 'wife and crying baby.' In 1856 or 1857 the
witness was introduced to the claimant as Mrs. Physick; visited
the house, and addressed her, and heard others address her, by
that name.
"Ralston speaks of their residing together as man and wife,
from 1855 downwards. He never knew what position they stood
in, until after Mr. Physick's death, but supposed they were married when they came back from Europe.
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. cStephens lived with the parties, as coachman, from March
13th 1854, until Mr. Physick's death. He heard the claimant
addressed as Mrs. Physick, in Mr. Physick's presence; heard
him speak of her as Mrs. Physick, to himself, his fellow-servants,
and twice to strangers; and he says they were generally reputed
as man and wife. Harmer's testimony, to the same general effect,
begins about 1856. He was introduced by the testator to the
lady as Mrs. Physick, and he frequently spoke of her as his
wife.
" Some reference must also be made to the testimony of Mrs.
Bouvier and Dr. Ritchie, which falls in whole or in part within
this time. Mrs. Bouvier thought they were man and wife, and
she was always addressed as Mrs. Physick. Dr. Ritchie says,
that so far as his understanding was, he believed them to be man
and wife, and knew nothing to the contrary. This testimony is
weakened somewhat by the fact that he always addressed her by
her Christian name of Fanny.
"cThere is great similarity in the facts -stated by the witnesses
prior to the act and since its passage. If the assent of the
claimant to the proceeding related only to the birth of the child,
the preponderance of the evidence would be decidedly in her
favor. If it admitted no marriage until the act was passed, the
weight would be nearly equal. By itself, therefore, a marriage
cannot fairly be inferred from the testimony of these witnesses.
If inferred at all, it must be presumed to have taken place at a
later date, and be established by other circumstances and witnesses in connection with the subsequent evidence of those already
mentioned.
"cAbout three months after the act had been passed, Mr. Physick, as already stated, procured his passport and sailed for
Europe with the claimant; returned in the fall of 1857, and
rented the house in Tenth street. The next summer he rented
the cottage at Cape May, and ended by residing in South street
up to the time of his death. During all this time his acts of
recognition were unequivocal.
"It must be admitted that the testimony, considered by itself,
would be sufficient to prove a marriage by reputation and admission. The countervailing circumstances are the declarations of
the testator, in his will, and the original illicit nature of the connection.
",To estimate properly the weight to be given to the testa-
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mentary statements, the position of the parties must be considered.
The claimant has renounced the provisions in her favor in the
will, and claims in opposition to that instrument. She stands in
an adverse attitude to the executors who represent the testator,
and thus in an adverse position to the testator himself. On the
supposition of an actual marriage, which he was obliged, as he
said to Miss Kelly, to conceal, he must be supposed to have contemplated the possibility of his wife claiming paramount to his
-will. Statements, therefore, in that instrument may have been
made with this view, and at any rate they are in accordance with
his wishes and in his own favor. If admissible at all, in a contest like the present, they can be allowed but little weight in
opposition to admissions against his own interest.
, The presumption that, as the intercourse was illicit originally,
it continued to be illicit, is met by the counter-presumption arising from the testimony, since the act of legitimation. According
to Senser vs. Bower, in the event of such countervailing presumptions, that in favor of innocence must prevail; and the cases
of Rose vs. Clark and Fenton vs. Reed show that presumptive
proof of marriage may be made, even where the connection
began illegally, and continued for a long time to be immoral.
In- the last instance, as soon as the parties became aware that
the prior husband was in life, their connection was not only illicit,
as in the case in hand, but adulterous, and therefore of a deeper
dye. In law and in morals, adultery is a higher crime, and
visited with more severe penalty, than mere meretricious intercourse. This fact must not be overlooked, for it forms the true
criterion for the application of many of the cases cited. If marriage from subsequent cohabitation, repute, and admissions, may
be presumed where the parties originally lived in adultery, surely
it may be presumed where they lived originally in concubinage.
, There remain the distinct and direct admissions of Mr. Physick, made since January 1857. At every step in the subsequent
testimony, we find some open avowal. In his passport, at the
hotel, on his voyages, in his own house, and at Cape May, he
holds out the lady as his wife. The most decisive testimony, and
that on which the whole case might almost be rested, is that of
Miss Kelly. He had married a lady, he said, in this city, and
had kept his marriage secret on account of his family. This
lady was the claimant, whom he afterwards brought to the house
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as his wife. Here was not only a formal and distinct admission,
but a plausible reason alleged for concealment. The argument
against this is, that he wished to enjoy her society, and could not
do so without passing her off to the world as his wife; but, if he
chose to use this deceit, he must abide the consequences.
" Undoubtedly, as was ably argued by the counsel for the
executors, there is a difference, where the question of marriage
or no marriage arises between the husband and third persons,
and where it arises between the husband and wife themselves.
Much slighter proof will render the husband responsible in the
one case than in the other. Upon grounds of public policy, a
man shall not hold himself out to be that which he is not, without
incurring all the responsibilities of his falsehood. A single
admission of partnership or marriage may establish a liability
where an innbcent third person is concerned. Still, where the
marriage is alleged by the wife, the difference is not in principle,
but in degree of proof. Certainly the admissions of Mr. Physick
would have rendered him liable to Trout for provisions, and to
Parvin for groceries, but they are equally evidence for the claimant. In the one instance they are conclusive; in the other they
may be rebutted by circumstances or other countervailing proof.
As admissions, they are as much against interest in the one case
as in the other.
- The award of the auditor upon the facts is equivalent, it is
said, to the finding of a jury in a trial at law. A jury is sworn
to render a true verdict according to the evidence, and can
regard nothing else. Acting upon this principle strictly, the
auditor has confined himself to the evidence before him, and
reports that the testimony is sufficient to establish a marriage
between Emlen Physick and Frances Mary Parmentier, subsequent to the birth of Emlen Physick, their son, by reputation,
by cohabitation as man and wife, and by admissions of the testator; and that these presumptions are not rebutted by the
irregularity of the original intercourse, by the act of legitimation,
or by the declarations in the will.
-The exact date of a marriage proved by testimony of this
nature cannot be accurately decided. It is necessary, however,
that some approximation to a date should be assumed, as upon
this will depend the further question, whether the daughter,
Ellen Elizabeth Physick, is legitimate or illegitimate, and, con-
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sequently, whether her legacy of $30,000 is subject or not to be
taxed as a collateral inheritance. She was born while her parents
were in London. Mr. Physick, in the conversation with Miss
Kelly, in which he so distinctly admitted his marriage, said that
he had not married in Europe; he .had married a lady in this
city. He had been, he said, in Europe, but did not like it.
These declarations were made shortly after his return, and of
themselves would lead to the inference that he had married before
he went abroad. The admissions prior to his voyage, though not
altogether so weighty as those made afterwards, are quite sufficient to corroborate this inference, and to warrant the auditor
in assuming that the marriage must have taken place before
the'voyage, that the child is consequently to be taken as the
legitimate offspring of the testator, and that the legacy is not
subject to the collateral tax."
Exceptions to this report were filed, and on the appezil the case
was argued by
James F. Johnson, for appellants.

J. T. Thomas and J. K. Findlay, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The report of the auditor so fully and accurately

expresses our views of the questions raised, that no possible good
could result from a new discussion of them. We cannot doubt
that the conclusions reached by him are sustained by the evidence.
At least the preponderance of the evidence is on the side of the
appellees. We therefore overrule the exceptions taken to the
decree of the Orphans' Oourt, and dismiss the appeal, referring
to the report of the auditor.
Appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant.

